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ON THE MATHEMATICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY*
GRACIELA CHICHILNISKY
Columbia University
Political economy views economic issues through the lens of political organisation .
In today's world, it must focus on the roles of markets and of democracy, two
concepts which are driving revolutionary changes in the political organisation of
both Europe and Asia . There are two main paradigms for the analysis of markets
and democracy, both of which have been mathematically advanced over a number
of years : the general equilibrium theory of markets, and social choice theory, which
examines practical aspects of democracy .' While it is true that political economy
has made some limited use of the latter in order to examine political-economic
issues of democracy, it has made little use of the former, the theory of market
behaviour .
The general equilibrium theory of markets has become a solid and intellectually
appealing thinking edifice . Its foundations have achieved the formidable status of
common knowledge . The first two Welfare Theorems link perfect market equilibria
with efficiency in the allocation of resources, and with the individual's egoistic
utility maximising goals.' These theorems have been perfected over a number of
years in several directions .' Other results exist in the theory of international mar-
kets which link market efficiency with the international division of labour and with
`gains from trade' . These have also achieved the status of common knowledge,
and their influence on policy is pervasive . However, the lack of major intellectual
advances in the theory of international markets in the last forty years, seems to
anticipate its demise ; for common knowledge follows theoretical advances, or the
lack of them, with a lag .
*This paper was prepared for the Political Economy Lecture, Harvard University, 22 March 1990.
1 thank the audience, particularly Juliet Schor and Amartya Sen, and Murray Milgate for valuable
comments .
'Arrow and Hahn (1971), and Sen (1970) provide main references .
Debreu (1954) offers a general presentation .
' A survey of results in this literature is in Arrow and Hahn (1971) .
' A mathematical exposition of the classical Heckscher-Ohlin model is in Jones (1965) .
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The major advances in the general equilibrium analysis of markets, of course,
were not achieved by political economists . They were achieved by economic theor-
ists without any explicit concern for the current issues of political economy . This is
partly due to the literary rather than mathematical approach to political economy
which has been generally adopted during the last half century . By a mathematical
approach I do not mean the application of statistical techniques to analyse data, nor
the application of lesser mathematical theorems or techniques . A mathematical
approach involves the sharp and illuminating effect of abstract, general and quali-
tative thinking, a process through which new mathematics is created . The fear that
mathematical analysis places the subject into the straight-jacket of quantitative
thinking is unfounded : qualitative mathematics such as topology or logic have
produced valuable insights into the functioning of economic systems, particularly
in social choice theory and in the theory of markets .'
Mathematics provide a clear logical basis for analysis, and also a means to
advance the logical analysis into practical and empirically testable propositions
and policies . A clear internal logic is fundamental for the dissemination of the
arguments . It is also fundamental for the participation in the debate of those whose
lives are affected by the evolution of ideas .
Changes in economic and political organisations are driven by such ideas . The
strong mathematical developments in the theory of markets of the last forty years
are not incidental to the driving power it achieved . Without strong, clear and
commonly accepted foundations, intellectual developments cannot take place .
Intellectual work without such foundations builds on moving sands . It must start
again with each paper, each book, each concept . It is an exhausting and often futile
enterprise . The whole structure of the edifice weakens and finally collapses .
Today's global embrace of markets and democracy will stretch the resources of
existing theories . It seems clear that in Eastern Europe markets arc desired as rep-
resentatives of freedom, as doors to escape totalitarian control and its hardships,
and to liberate economic resources to productive activities . Democracy provides a
hope for participation in the political organisation . In view of the prominence
achieved by these concepts, and the hopes placed on them, theoretical advances in
the theories of markets and democracy are needed more than ever . Several areas
seem ripe for analysis, but only three will be discussed here : markets and democ-
racy, the perfect market and its environment, and policies and market responses .
These three areas are chosen because of their importance and their proven fertility
in producing interesting insights which have attracted wide attention .
Topological foundations of social choice theory were established in Chichilnisky (1980A) . Global
analysis of competitive markets in, for example, Debreu (1976) and Chichilnisky (1986B) .
AN AGENDA FOR POLITICAL ECONOMY
1 . Markets and Democracy
The connection between democracy and markets is not at all clearly understood .
Free markets are one form of economic activity which emerges in free societies . Both
have occurred in less free societies, indeed democracy emerges in the context of
strongly repressed minorities (for example, slavery) and free markets have coexisted
with repressive and totalitarian regimes, as is generally accepted in the case of Chile
until very recently . The connection between these two concepts has indeed beci ,
discussed by literary means; but it has not been logically or mathematically analysed
in the context of a well-defined model . This is the foundation which is needed .Since
both the theory of markets and the theory of social choice have been mathematically
formalised (see Arrow and Hahn, 1971 ; Sen, 1970; Chichilnisky, 1980A), this
should not be an impossible task . We need clear, general results about this import-
ant issue . We need a mathematical approach, to determine positive findings, the
boundaries of what is known or agreed, and the empirical conditions under which
different relationships occur . We need a logical foundation and a mathematical
edifice to build upon these areas which are the daily concern of many people across
the world .
The agenda and the methodology of research on markets should be taken up by
political economists . It should not be left to other areas . The problem of market
imperfections, which has occupied much of the literature in economic theory over
the last decade, is of lesser import, since any result in this area is suspect of dis-
appearing once the markets are perfected . Perfect markets should be examined by
political economists, and using state of the art methodologies . As part of this
agenda, the theory of markets in its general and elegant form must be extended to
more realistic economic environments . This means that without changing the 'per-
fectly competitive' market structure, certain meta-assumptions which are always
automatically accepted as the market's `environment', but which are artificial,
should be improved . Doing do could bring powerful and general results which will
be useful in developing realistic aspects of the theory .
2 . Competitive markets with endogenous endowments
The most widely accepted formalisation of a competitive market economy is the
Arrow-Debreu model (see, for example, Arrow and Hahn, 1971) . In this model, the
initial endowments of the economy are not explained by the market conditions, but
rather are exogenous parameters that describe the non-market environment. In all
versions of that model, the initial endowments are described by a fixed vector in
Euclidean space, a vector which is given to the market as an initial condition, and
which is not related to the market behaviour in any way . The fixed endowments in
the Arrow-Debreu model are therefore a feature of the model which is unrelated to
the competitive market behaviour . The existence of such unexplained objects is not
a unique feature of the competitive market model . Indeed, all mathematical models
are defined by providing `primary' objects, which are taken as given and not
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explained by the model. These are typically the rules of the logic utilised by the
model, the language, and the axioms of the model . Such is the role of the initial
endowments in the model that is accepted widely as the paradigm of competitive
markets .
In the competitive market model, endowments are not unique in this treatment :
technologies (production functions) and individual preferences (or utility func-
tions) are also treated as `primitive', anti are therefore left unexplained by the
model . Technologies, utilities and endowittcnts are given initially and are assumed
not to depend on market behaviour . They are part of the model's external environ-
ment . Thus changing the assumption on how the endowments are given, or chang-
ing the way technologies and preferences are given, changes the way in which the
environment of the competitive market i > defined . These changes are suggested
here as a way of improving the model, and of enriching its results .
It is rather natural that initial endowments may vary in a manner which depends
on the market behaviour . A case in point is given by resources . The literature on
resource economics has considered initial endowments of resources as price depen-
dent . They depend on prices in two ways : in one, the initial endowment of a
resource is measured with respect to the economically feasible quality or `grade' of
the resource, namely that quality which yields a greater energy value than it costs to
extract or produce . As prices change the quantity of the resource available changes :
more initial endowments (i .e . endowments of lower grade) become economically
feasible at higher energy prices . Tar sands, a form of oil resource, became economi-
cally feasible as the price of oil escalated quickly in the 1970s, and the total quantity
of that oil resource was therefore expanded to include tar sands . Another way in
which initial endowments of resources vary as function of prices is through the
production of the resources . The research, discovery and extraction of a resource
are economic activities closely related to prices . As market prices of the resource
increase, more research and development takes place, and more of the endowments
is uncovered . There are, in all, more initial endowments of the resource for the
economy (see, e .g . Heal, 1980) .
Other areas of economics have also investigated the issue of variable or market-
dependent initial endowments . In international economics, Kemp and Jones
(1972), Chichilnisky (1981, 1986A), and Findlay and Kierkowski (1983) among
others have investigated fruitfully the implications of a variable labour supply in
general equilibrium models of international trade . These are models which share
many of the Hekscher-Ohlin characteristics but rather than assuming that initial
endowments (of capital or labour) are fixed, these are allowed to vary with market
prices .
There is another manner in which the variation of initial endowments has been
considered : in the case of transfers . Here total initial endowments of the economy
remain fixed, but the quantity of these endowments allocated to the different agents
changes . One considers changes of the initial endowments of two parties : the donor
and the receiver . The total quantity of the endowment in the economy remains
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fixed, since the amounts donated and received cancel out . There is however a
methodological difference between transfers and endogenous endowment,; . Here
initial endowments of the agents do not varv with market conditions . Rather, they
are changed by° a voluntary act which is outside the market functioning, such as a
gift or transfer . The issue is the impact that such changes have on the s~)lutiorts,
i .e . the comparison of the equilibria of the model before and after the transfer . In
other words, one studies the effects on the equilibrium market prices ref shifting -he
allocation of initial endowments among the agents in the economy .
The study of such shifts and the corresponding market prices in the nc .~ equilib-
rium is properly described as `comparative statics' . Traditionally transfer problctns
were studied in international economics in the context of 2 x 2 x 2 models of inter-
national trade (V,vO goods, two countries, two inputs of production) . Significantly
more flexibility was added in Chichilnisky (198013) with the inclusion of one more
country, resulting in a 2 x 3 x 2 model of trade, again an instance of the .-\rrow-
Debreu model of competitive markets . This time the total initial endowments are
fixed, and one studies the comparative statics of transfers, i .e . changes in the market
equilibrium which occur as the allocations among the parties is varied by a transfer
or gift from one country to another . This added flexibility in the model's environ-
ment resulted in novel and widely debated results, in particular in the discovery
that transfer paradoxes do occur in standard situations such as in stable markets
with unique equilibria, a phenomenon which was considered impossible before
Chichilnisky (1980) . The so called transfer paradox is the fact that after a gift, the
donor is better off and the receiver worse off, in the new equilibrium . This is due to
the new market prices, also called terms of trade, which favour the donor and dis-
favour the receiver . Further results refined the initial theorems, providing e.g .
necessary and sufficient conditions for this transfer paradox to occur (Chichilnisky,
1983) . A lively debate and a large literature emerged from the discovery of the
transfer paradox in stable markets with three or more countries (see e.g . Geanakoplos
and Heal, 1983) .
It is worth emphasising that none of these authors nor their models challenge the
perfectly competitive assumptions of the market . They all assume perfectly com-
petitive markets . The only difference is in their formalisation of one of the aspects
of the perfect market's environment . In some, this refers to the initial endowments .
These are no longer exogenously given parameters, but they are rather explained by
the market behaviour . Initial endowments are therefore endogenous to the model .
In the other cases, initial endowments are fixed but one studies the impact of reallo-
cating them among the agents of the model . The number of agents is increased from
two, the traditional number of countries in international economics, to three .
The procedure of endogenising endowments should be differentiated from the
practice of altering the standard competitive market assumptions, of introducing
market imperfections . The latter is arguably a less preferable practice, because such
imperfections are often seen as approximations to the competitive model, and thus
less robust . The results often `wash away' as new markets are introduced to deal
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with the imperfection in the old ones . Models with imperfections have therefore
less theoretical appeal and strength . Although :tr the short run they appease our
need for more realism, in practice, models of market imperfections have simply
reinforce,] the unique position of the perfectly r :.lnpetitive market model in the
theory of markets . The perfectly competitive rm :-.1 .:1 as Corinalised by Arrow
and
Debreu or related versions (a special case of w r !Qr :_l the typical 2 x 2 x 2 model of
international trade) remains the conceptual e i,~ ,, i-_:1 with which we measure new
results . It remains the more general, clear, s,11. : '. _.o11 , _'Cp1Ualisition of market's . It
remains the theoretical standard of the theory .
implications .1 iTheendvgenisation of initial endowments }r .l ~ : l~-,niricant practical
While not changing the conceptual market sm ; "Ilre of the perfectly competitive
model, when endowments are endogenous, it:Pending for instance cm market
prices, the results of the theory are significantlz .alter=ed . They appear tv be more
realistic and appealing, as will be discussed below . Before presenting some
examples, it may be useful to point out that I do not refer here to price-dependent
resources which appear because the resources arc treated as produced goods rather
than as initial data . For example, one could consider oil a produced good and
its quantity would be explained by the behaviour of competitive producers who
maximise profits . This is a legitimate exercise, and it yields a price-dependent
supply of oil . In this sense, it may be said that in such a model oil endowments are
endogenous . However, if the producers face some other exogenously given fixed
endowment, for example, land, to produce oil, the procedure is simply another
version of the Arrow-Debreu exogenous endowment in disguise . As long as the
economy's producers face a fixed and non-market dependent initial endowment, we
are back in the Arrow-Debreu formulation . The results of the theory_ are therefore,
as can be expected, the same as those of the Arrow-Debreu model .
The differences arise when exogenous fixed initial endowments for a particular
produced good do not exist at all, that is, when for a good that is used as an input of
production, the initial endowments are not explained as being produced by profit
maximisers from some other fixed quantity of goods which is in turn, left unex-
plained . There must be some input which is genuinely endogenous in the sense that
its initial endowments are not exogenously fixed, nor explained as produced from
other exogenously fixed endowments . When at least some of the goods have this latter
property, then the model is said to have endogenous endowments, and
the results of
the theory are significantly altered . The next section explores these differences .
In one case, the Pareto optimality of the competitive equilibrium is lost so that
pricing policies can improve overall welfare . This happens because the overall
production set (as endowments vary) is non-convex, even though the technologies
are all convex . Endogenous endowments are also shown to lead to substantial differ-
ences in the properties of general equilibrium models of international trade, and we
shall also see examples of this type . Finally, we refer to the variation of initial
endowments of the agents in the case of transfers, and discuss the results obtained
by the expansion of the traditional two-country environment to three countries .
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2(a) Endogenous endowments : non-convexities with constant returns to scale
We consider an economy with market responsive endowments and constant
- >lo >i<~s . W isreturns to scale t<_hau ~ . e den1<r . trat< that the model has :3 unique stable
competitive equilibriumxhich is Pareto inefficient . This property i, robust in the
sense that it is m ,rarr
.
~tra inert for variations of everyv parameter in the rrv<1c~ withira .r ;,.
interval O1~ prw
. iv<" me tsire . We show that, rwrn a t ~s1t r c the endogeneit of the endco.c-
,~ ,,menuthe overall o ,_.cdue uc n frontier er:'_rl ;ra model is non-convex,~ ~~ ven though f,-
each fixed endowment . the production f .mctions display constant r,_-,urns to scalc .
The non-eorwe:city is produced by the r,. , o~ nse to prices of the initial err,lr wrnerr s
and leads to losses c f market efficierl~ : Except for having enclob e nears ]nits :
endowments, the model is an instance ot the Arrow-Debreu model O_ a Lcrf<ct}ti
competitive market economy .
There are two outputs which are denoted B and I (in sympathy with the nota[IOC}.
of Chichilnisky, 1986) . There are two inputs, R (for resources) and ,1l (for-
machines), the endowments of which arc '.)oth price dependent . The technology is
described by
B=min (R ti' a , Mu1cl)
where R}' denotes the amount of input R used in producing output B, etc . We let
D=arc=-a,c,,
the determinant of the matrix of technical coefficients .
The endowments of the two inputs are given by
R =a pnlpti -! - R (3)
M= b(P""P+M, (4
where a and b are positive numbers, R and N1 indicate resources available at zero
prices, and p ; denotes the price of good "v . Endowments are thus endogenous : their
supply is described by a function which is homogeneous in degree zero in prices,
and non-decreasing in the relative price of the good concerned .
The technology displays constant returns to scale and fixed proportions, so that
profit maximisation implies zero profits and the output prices must satisfy :
which in turn imply :
I=min (Rl ;a-_, Ml ic,) (2)
' 'The example presented here was developed initially in Chichilnisky and Heal (1979) and based on a
model by Chichilnisky (1981, 1986A) .
Ps = alpR+cip.u (5)
pt = a,PR + e3PAQ (6)
PR = (Pt3c,-ptcr)ID
We complete the model by supposing there to be a single consumer who owns the
entire supplies of both inputs, and uses the proceeds from the sale of these to
purchase outputs. Theutility function of this consumer is
U(B,I)=cB+dl,
	
(13)
with both c and d positive numbers. In equilibrium, if both B and I are produced
(and we shall give conditions which ensure this subsequently),
The consumer's income Y is
and
PBIPI=cld. (14)
Y=PMM+PRR _ _
=PMb(PMIPB)
2
+pA~ +PRaPRIPB +PRR (15)
and the balancing of the consumer's budget requires that
PI7+PBB=Y (16)
at prices satisfying (14), the consumer will be indifferent between all (B,I) pairs
satisfying (16) . Outputs are therefore determined entirely on the supply side by (11)
and (12) . It is tedious but trivial to substitute these into (16), use (3), (4) and(6) and
verify that at these outputs and prices the consumer's budget balances . A competi-
tive equilibrium is therefore characterised by a set of prices at which all markets
clear, and by optimising behaviour of producers and consumers. In view of the
above an equilibrium is characterised by the equations:
PB*=CPI*= 41PR*= (cC- dc,)ID (17)
p*At =(dal :ca2)/D,
and the values of R*,M*, B*,andI* whichcan be computed from (3), (4), (11), and
(12) by substitution . Denote the associated output levels by (B*, I*). It is conve-
nient, though not essential, that these are strictly positive, so we shall establish
and
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Figure l .
conditions to ensure this . In particular, we shall establish conditions under which
(B*, I*) is givenby the intersection ofthe lines representing the resource constraints
Except in singular cases, which can be neglected because of the openness of the
results established in Chichilnisky and Heal (1979), this must occur at a strictly
positive output vector, see Fig. 1 .
At the intersection of the two resource constraints, both inputs are fully used and
so command strictly positive prices . We are therefore interested in establishing con-
ditions underwhichPR andpm are strictly positive . It is clear from this construction
that the equilibrium, if it exists, will be unique .
From (17),
PR>0iff(c x c2)/D>(d x C)/D (18)
pm >0iff da,/D> ca2/D.
Suppose that D>0. Then a,/a2 >cl/C, and (18) implies
a,/a 2 > c/d>c,/C (19)
whereas if D<0, a,/a2 <c,/C, and (18) implies
a,/a2<c/d<c,/C. (20)
So (19) or (20), together with the corresponding sign of D, are sufficient to ensure
that (B*, I*) is positive . We have therefore shown the existence of a positive price
equilibrium, under the conditions . Next is the proof of the inefficiency of this
equilibrium. The proof itself is contained in the Appendix, but the argument is
illustrated in Fig. 2 and discussed below.
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PA1=(Pla, -PBa2)ID. (8)
Similarly, input requirements are given by :
R=Bat +Ia2 (9)
M= Bc,+IC (10)
which imply that when inputs are used efficiently
B=(Rc2-Mat)/D (11)
I=(Mal -Rc,)ID . (12)
Figure 2 .
In Fig. 2, AP denotes the production
possibility set in B and I with the initial
endowments available when the price vector isp, andA denotes the union ofthe sets
AP, for all p . At (B*, I*) an indifference
curve, which is identical with a price line, is
tangent to the feasible set defined by the intersection ofMand R constraints. If B*
and I* are strictly positive, and if the locus of intersection of these constraints is the
graph ofaconvex function (this locus gives the boundary of the projection of A into
output space), then the linear utility function cannot assume its maximumover A at
(B*, I*). All that remains to be shown is, as prices vary, the locus ofthe intersection of
thetwo constraints traces out the graph of a convex function. A sufficient condition
for this is that the derivative d2B/d72>0. This is shown in the Appendix . The
relevant frontier is thus always convex, and the equilibrium is always inefficient
under the convexity conditions, namely higher indifference curves couldbe attained
from the resources available at prices other than the equilibrium prices . Such
inefficiencies ofthe competitive equilibrium cannot occur with fixed initial endow-
ments. In this case, the competitive equilibrium is always Pareto efficient.
It is apparent that the conditions (19) and (20), used to establish the strict posi-
tivity ofB* and I*, are conditions which are satisfied by sets of the parameter values
al, a2, c l , C, a, b, c and d which contain open sets . The essential property of the
example is thus robust to changes in the values of the parameters specifying the
technology, preferences and the endowment functions. Indeed it should be quite
clear that the linearity that has been assumed for the technology andthe preferences
is assumed for computational convenience only andthat similar non-linear relation-
ships could give the same result.
In sum: endogeneity in the initial endowments generates certain non-convexities
in production and inefficiencies in the market equilibrium even when preferences
have the standard characteristics assumed in the Arrow-Debreu model, when
technologies have constant returns to scale and where there exist no market imper-
fections . We showed an example where for each price, the production possibility
set is convex, but it becomes non-convex as resources vary with different prices .
We showed that this prodpces inefficiencies in the competitive equilibrium. The
equilibrium is unique and the properties mentioned are robust in the sense that they
remain invariant with small changes in the parameters of the model.
In Chichilnisky and Heal (1979) it is also shown that the unique equilibrium in
the above example is Walrasian stable . We could say that the competitive equilib-
rium is `restricted' Pareto efficient in the sense thatat the equilibrium prices and the
corresponding initial endowments, the equilibrium is indeed Pareto efficient. This
follows from the fact that at those prices andthose (fixed) endowments the model is
identical to the Arrow-Debreu model of competitive markets . However, there is no
reason for restricting the allocations to those available for one price only, even if this
is a market clearing price. When all possible prices, and thus all potential initial
endowments, are considered, the Pareto efficiency of the competitive equilibrium is
lost . In view of these results, it wouldbe natural to study the conditions on endow-
ment responses underwhich the competitive equilibrium regains its efficiency, and
no intervention is needed .
It should be noted that non-convexities in production do not imply that com-
petitive equilibrium is inefficient . In Arrow-Debreu market economies with fixed
initial endowments competitive equilibrium is always Pareto efficient, quite inde-
pendently from the convexity of the production possibility set. In a fixed endow-
ments economy, a competitive equilibrium set of prices always separates feasible
outputs from allocations with higher indifference levels, so that we indeed have
Pareto optimality of the competitive equilibrium, even with non-convexities in
production .
However, in convex economies with variable endowments the situation is quite
different. At the equilibrium price the production possibility frontier is convex, andat
those prices andthe corresponding endowments, theequilibrium allocation is indeed
Pareto efficient.However, thereexist otherprices andthe correspondingendowments
at which higher indifference surfaces maybe achieved, even though markets may_not
clear. The example provided above shows this effect clearly. Further discussion is
found in Chichilnisky and Heal (1979); other references for economies with non-
convexities and providing similar arguments for the fixed endowments case, are
provided in Brown and Heal (1979, 1983) and Chichilnisky (1990B).
2(b) Endogenous endowments and relative advantages
International economics has investigated the issue of variable endowments for
several years, see e.g . Kemp and Jones (1972). In Chichilnisky (1981) a point was
raised whichhadnot been considered before: that in Arrow-Debreu markets where
endowments are allowed to vary endogenously with prices, both `gains from trade'
and the (Heckscher-0hlin) theory of relative advantages are qualified strongly, and
n many cases appear to reverse. These results are obtained in models with constant
eturns to scale in production . They show that a country may be worse off by
exporting further quantities of the good in which it has a relative advantage, in the
ense that larger quantities of exports leads to lower terms of trade, a worsening
listribution of income, and lower production and consumption of both goods in the
;xporting country. Reciprocally, the importing country benefits unequivocally
'rom the new situation as it consumes more of both goods, imports more at a
ower total cost, and exports less receiving more total revenues for the exports. The
:heorems in Chichilnisky (1981 and 1986A) provide a range of parameters for the
iegative effects of export led policies on the exporting country, and this leads to
specific policy recommendations aboutwhen there are gains from further trade, and
when there are not. The results obtained in 2 x 2 x 2 models of international trade
with variable endowments are still general and elegant, but have more depth and are
more relevant to today's concerns . For example, they recommend circumstances in
which leapfrogging into new technologies is more appropriate than emphasising
historically given relative advantages (see e.g . Chichilnisky, 1981, 1986A, 1990A) .
These results gave rise to an extensive literature and a lively debate about the
adjustment processes towards a Walrasian equilibrium which has only recently
been settled (see Lysy, 1985, Chichilnisky, 1986A).
The formulation of markets with endogenously determined (i .e . market respon-
sive) endowments seems more realistic than that of fixed initial endowments . So
does the prescription now obtained of not specialising in relative advantages in
certain cases, in order not to emphasise a relative weakness . Many relative advan-
tages are better lost than emphasised. Poor countries have a relative advantage in
manual work which is poorly paid . Their best strategy may be in escaping this
relative advantage as soon as possible, as done by the Asian Tigers, and specialise
quickly in capital and skill intensive solutions. Women have a relative advantage at
having children and caring for them, but again they may be better off escaping the
specialisation in this relative advantage since it is not well rewarded . Similarly,
there are limits beyond which an emphasis on international trade over and above
domestic development, seems misplaced. It can lead to a break between the chain
that links supply and demand . This happenswhere local markets are only sources of
supply (cheap labour) and foreign markets source of demand . Thus the balancing
effect of the two sides of the market is greatly weakened .
The general point is that the assumption of fixed endowments singles endow-
mentsout as variables which do not depend on market forces, while others do . This
assumption is at the root of many important traditional results of the theory. Its
removal has been and will continue to be fruitful in the research agenda of
competitive markets.
The discovery of the reversal of gains from trade and relative advantage theories
as soon as endowments are market dependent, has led to many studies in inter-
national economics and in general equilibrium theory .' It promises to make the
' See, for example, the references provided in Chichilnisky (1986A) .
general theory of international markets more adapted to today's concerns . Whenever
trade takes place between `unequals', agents with widely different endowments and
consumption patterns, as is-the often case in our world economy, these consider-
ations are likely to emerge in all their strength . It is under those conditions that
endowments tend to vary with market conditions . For example, the supply of
labour to a given market is not fixed but rather strongly dependent on prices, when
the market stands within a larger area with much lower income per capita . Similar
considerations apply to capital markets. These are the cases where gains from trade
must be qualified, and where the theory of relative advantages applies only up to a
point, beyond which it can be said to backfire .
3 . Variable endowments : transfers and markets
Transfers between the parties of a competitive market are another instance of vari-
able endowments . The overall endowments of the economy remain fixed, but vari-
ation is allowed on the initial allocation of the various agents . As these individual
allocations (which remain fixed in the Arrow-Debreu model) vary, the competitive
equilibrium changes and with it the welfare of the agents. An example is provided
by the interaction between transfers (such as those beingmade by Western Europe
to reallocating Eastern Europeans at present) and market prices . Transfers change
the endowments of the agents . As such, they change the economic environment,
and therefore the market prices at the new equilibrium. In perfect markets this can
have negative effects on the receivers of the transfer, since prices can rise against
them and defeat the original intention of the transfer . This is the classic transfer
problem which was recently shown to occur within the framework of a perfect and
stable general equilibrium economy, provided the economy has at least three
agents', a result which generated wide interest . The importance of this result re-
sides in the general framework of competitive general equilibrium theory within
which it was obtained . The attention it created is due to the intrinsic power of-a
mathematical approach which provides a strong basis for building, and which
allows the result to stand along with the major theorems ofwelfare economics in the
general equilibrium theory of markets.
It is of interest that what we call a transfer paradox is an effect regarded as
quite standard in policy circles . Consider for example the loans of approximately
DM5 bn currently made to the USSR by major German banks, with the credit
backing of the West German government . It is reasonably expected that this
`transfer' (namely the government's security offered so that the loans be extended)
will eventually benefit the German economy because of market responses: it will
lead to increased demand for German exports to the USSR, and to better terms of
`The discovery that the transfer paradox occurs in stable markets, namely that .i n a stable market the
donor of a transfer may benefit while the receiver loses due to new market prices is in Chichilnisky
(1980B) . Numerous other pieces including Chichilnisky (1983) Geanakoplos and Heal (1983), and others
have subsequently enlarged the literature on the subject .
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trade for Germany. This is in effect what the transfer paradox predicts . Adding
more realistic assumptions about the market environment may allow the standard
theory of competitive markets to explain common sense results, without resorting
toad hoc assumptions about market failures .
4 . Mixed economies : policies and market responses
Little is known of the general equilibrium of mixed economies, which are
the
economies we all live in . The interaction between policies and the free market are
still to be understood . Some of this has been formalised in the theory of so
called
rational expectations . The formalisation assumes that the agents know how to
compute the impact of policies on the general equilibrium, i.e . how to compute the
market response to policies, and use this knowledge in their decision making . This
assumption breaks with the tradition of the competitive agent which is assumed to
be, or act as if it was, unable to compute the market equilibrium . The theory of
rational expectations, however, deals with a very special case, where the agents
know how to compute the new equilibrium only when a certain parameter (such as
interest rates) has been changed by policy . The more general issue is where the
knowledge of the agent should stop : whether the agent can compute the impact of
its actions, of other's actions in response to his, etc. The issue knits a continuous
path between general equilibrium theory of perfect markets, and the theory of
games. The latter has usually been devoid of general statements about market
behaviour. Acloser link between game theory and the general equilibrium theory of
markets would improve this situation.
SUMMARY
We have emphasised the importance of the analysis of markets in the political
economy agenda . This analysis should be a general, qualitative and offer a strong
mathematical foundation for the best development and communication of the ideas .
Within this agenda, a main open issue is the relationship between markets and
democracy. This issue can be developed in a formalised fashion, by using the math-
ematical foundations offered by the theory of general equilibrium of competitive
markets, and by the analysis of democracy offered in social choice 'heory .
Within the theory ofmarkets, we indicated the desirability ofremaining within the
general competitive model rather than dealing with ad hoc market imperfections .
Despite their immediate appeal, the latter are typically dismissed as ephemeral, and
expected to disappear as more markets emerge and the imperfections decrease in
importance .
The economic environment of the competitive market was singled out as an area
ripe for further research after a decade of fast development of results which
attracted wide interest and debate . The Arrow-Debreu model extended to admit
endogenous, market responsive endowments was examined in some detail .
Examples were produced of the difference in the results of the competitive markets
theory which emerge when endowments are endogenous rather than part of the
fixed, non-market, environment which appears in the Arrow-Debreu model. We
examined the implications of endogenous endowments within the general model of
competitive markets, and in international economics. In the latter we mentionedthe
emphasis on relative advantages as opposed to `leapfrogging technologies' .
Another area of research which produced widely discussed results involving
changes in the market environment is that of transfers in market economies. The
area deals with variations in the endowments of the agents which leave the. total
endowments of the economy unchanged. These variations are voluntary rather
than market dependent, but they have an impact on market prices . The results here
are of a `comparative static' nature . We discussed recent results on the transfer
paradox, which have wide application to international economic policies at present.
In sum: the competitive market and its environment provides a fruitful area for
research . Original results have been obtained which attracted wide attention over a
short period . Several important and interesting questions remain open, dealing
with issues of practical importance to which economic theory has not provided gen-
eral theoretical solutions. The suggestion is for political economy to take over the
research agenda andto do so by utilising the advanced, elegant andgeneral methods
which give the theory of markets its current standing in economics.
The aim is to advance our understanding of markets, their value and their limi-
tations, in a general, qualitative way. A strong, simple logical framework leads
naturally to the achievement of results. Once the proper foundations are laid out,
one can build. Political economy must build on abstract and general mathematical
thinking. It is the only way to assure clarity, a strong foundation, and the desired
advance in areas which are of great importance for intellectuals and for those whose
lives depend on it .
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Computation reveals :
dB/dpB = (pt/p2e)[(cic2a)/D
2] + [(2 ai ' a2b)ID](pI'Ip3B) - [2aia22b)ID3] (pr/p2 B) =f"
d2B/dp2B= [(- 2c,c2a)/D2](pr/p3,)- [(6a'2a2b)ID
3 ](p,2 /p,4)+ [(4aja22b)ID3](pi/p,3) = f" .
dI/dpB = [(- 2a , 3b)ID
3](pi2IPB3) +[(2a,2a2b)/D 3](PIIPB2 ) - (C, 2ap,)ID
2p. 2 = g.
d2l/dp.2= [(6a 1 3b)ID
3
](pI2 Ip.4)-[4a , 2 a2b)/D](pr/ps3 ) + (2c, 2apr)IDPB3
=g,
.
From the above one obtains :
APPENDIX
d2B/dI2 =[(gf" -.fg°)I(g)2](lIg) .
gf"-.fg"= -pi3 Ip,6[(2aba, 2c,)ID4]-pt4/p,7[(l0a, 5a2b2)/D6] .
The purpose of this appendix is to prove the convexity of the production possibility set ofthe
model presented in Section 2(a) . It suffices to prove that d2/B/dI2 > 0 .
Let B =f(PB) and I =g(p,) . Then dBldI =fIg' and
(21)
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This term is clearly negative so from (21) it follows that
Sign(d28/dI2) = - sign(g') .
Now, g'=(a2-a1P1IPB)(2pr1pB2)(a,26ID3)-(c,2alD2)(P,IPa2)
which from (8) is
g'= (-P,2p,a~2b)IPB'D2-(C12ap,)IDpB2 .
It is therefore clear that g' is always negative, the relevant frontier is always convex, and the
equilibrium is always inefficient since preferences are linear. It is also apparent that the
conditions (19) and (20) used to establish the strict positivity of B* and I* are satisfied by sets
of the parameter values a', a 2 , c c 2 , a, b, c, and d which contain open sets . The essential
properties of the example are therefore robust to small changes in the values of the par-
ameters specifying the technology, preference and endowment functions in the model of
Section 2(a) . Walrasian stability of the equilibrium has been established in Chichilnisky and
Heal (1979) .
